existence, Maya can be nothing but a power of
Brahman, a force of his consciousness or a result of
his being; and if the Jivatman, one with Brahman,
is subject to its own Maya, the Brahman in it is
subject to Maya. But this is not intrinsically or
fundamentally possible: the subjection can only be
a submission of something in Nature to an action
of Nature which is part of the conscious and free
movement of the Spirit in things, a play of its own
self-manifesting Omniscience. Ignorance must be
part of the movement of the One, a development
of its consciousness knowingly adopted, to which it
is not forcibly subjected but which it uses for its
cosmic purpose.

It is not open to us to get rid of the whole
difficulty by saying that the Jivatman and the
Supreme are not One, but eternally different, the
one subject to ignorance, the other absolute in being
and consciousness and therefore in knowledge; for
this contradicts the supreme experience and the
whole experience which is that of unity in being,
whatever difference there may be in the action of
Nature. It is easier to accept the fact of unity in
difference which is so evident and pervasive in all
the building of the universe and satisfy

ourselves
with the statement that we are one, yet
different,
one in essential being and therefore in
essential
nature, different in soul-form and
therefore in
active nature. But we thereby only state
the fact,
leaving the difficulty raised by the fact
unsolved,
how that which belongs in the essence of
its being